English law, Brahmo marriage, and the problem of religious difference: civil marriage laws in Britain and India by Chatterjee, Nandini
English Law, Brahmo Marriage, and
the Problem of Religious Difference:
Civil Marriage Laws in Britain and
India
NANDINI CHATTERJEE
University of Plymouth
T H E “ C I V I L ” O F C I V I L M A R R I A G E
On the face of it, civil marriage represents both the most typical and most
anodyne aspect of modern law. One might say that by instituting civil marriage,
a bureaucratic, enumerative, and secularized state permits its subjects absolute
individual choice of marital partners, and concurrently, by refusing to take into
account the religious afﬁliation of any party, grants total freedom of religious
faith. As such, it may be seen as a quintessentially modern phenomenon, con-
nected through the adjective “civil” with other distinctively modern concepts
such as civil society, all of which point to a notion of individual liberty, predi-
cated upon a modern state guaranteeing the autonomy of large arenas of social
life.
Indeed, the few existing studies of European civil marriage laws do take such
a view. One scholar asserted upfront, “If the central characteristic of democratic
capitalist society is mass choice, then democratic capitalist marriage arrived in
Britain on 1 July 1837” (the date on which the Marriage Act of 1836, which for
the ﬁrst time permitted civil marriage, came into operation).1 Prior to this, all
marriages to be legally valid had to be celebrated in an Anglican church, in day-
light hours, with appropriate Anglican ceremonies conducted by an ofﬁciating
Anglican priest. Excepted were the marriages of Jews and Quakers, royal mar-
riages, marriages abroad, and marriages under the Archbishop’s special
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1 Olive Anderson, “The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian England and Wales,” Past and
Present 69 (Nov. 1965): 50–87, at 50.
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license.2 The freedom that the new law offered was therefore from the authority
of an established church. Unsurprisingly, the demand for this was ofﬁcially
voiced by those who did not belong to the established church, in particular
the Nonconformists. How the law was used turned out to be regionally variable,
and although scholars have been divided over the reasons for such variation, the
consensus appears to be that the ideology of secularism had little to do with it.3
The passing reference to secularism in the debate over British civil marriage
laws indicates the larger theoretical signiﬁcance of a set of administrative laws
relating to “personal matters,” which ostensibly have little to do with the pol-
itical system. But it is precisely in the “personal” realm, and during near uni-
versal life-cycle events such as birth, marriage, and death, that the majority
of people most frequently confront both organized religion and the legal con-
sequences of religious confession. In fact, the very distinction between a “per-
sonal” sphere where “private” beliefs (including religious beliefs) may be
safely held without their effects spilling into the “public” world of the
market and the polity is characteristic of modernizing ideologies, even if this
is unevenly achieved in practice. A history of marriage laws, especially of
those explicitly associated with the problem of religious difference, can there-
fore serve as an entry into the debates about “secularization,” or theories of dis-
tinctively modern religion-state relationships.
Secularism is of course a suspect and amorphous term, and nowhere more so
than in South Asian studies. A compendium of scholarly usages of the term
would reveal an almost inﬁnite number of distinct deﬁnitions ranging from
secularism-as-ideology to secularism-as-theory-of-social change, usually with
unselfconscious combinations of the subjective and the objective. It is not
even clear whether these may be legitimately uncoupled; José Casanova
attempted to produce a summary of the “pure” sociological theory by
parsing it into its three components: that with modernity, religion (a) declines,
(b) is privatized, and (c) is institutionally differentiated from other spheres of
social life.4 Casanova’s own argument, based on his studies of political and
highly public religions in Europe and the Americas, is that only the third
part of this theory is at present credible. If we followed his model, it would
be possible to say that the British civil marriage law of 1836 was symptomatic
2 H.S.Q. Henriques, “Jewish Marriages and the English law,” Jewish Quarterly Review 20, 3
(1908): 391–449, at 400. Also see below.
3 Roderick Floude and Pat Thane, “Debate: The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian
England and Wales,” Past and Present 84 (Aug. 1979): 146–54; Olive Anderson, “The Incidence
of Civil Marriage in Victorian England and Wales: A Rejoinder,” Past and Present 84 (Aug. 1979):
155–62.
4 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization,”Hedgehog Review 8, 1–2 (2006): 7–22, at 7. Here
Casanova summarizes his larger and massively inﬂuential work, Public Religions in the Modern
World (Chicago, 1997).
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of the secularization process, even if none of the parties that debated it articu-
lated an explicit ideology of secularism.
Most South Asianists would question the legitimacy of such a distinction. As
Talal Asad has observed, institutional differentiation may not be a meaningful
concept when religious ideology can clearly inform economic, pedagogic, and
political behavior. Asad himself looks at secularism (or the secular) as a norma-
tive idea, actively pursued by modern or would-be-modern states, which
assumes a priori that there exists a differentiable quantity, called religion,
which can inﬂuence society without being merged in it.5 Postcolonial criticism
has also complicated the relation between secularism, modernity, and liberty. If
the secular state does not simply liberate the citizen from the clutches of reli-
gion, what does it then do? Asad has suggested that it demands of citizens trans-
cendent loyalty to the nation-state, in an apparently paradoxical extension of
the principle of cuius regio eius religio (the religion of the ruler is the religion
of the subjects). In the process of demanding the prioritization of loyalties, it
also authoritatively constructs the entity that it ostensibly wishes to distance
itself and its subjects’ primary loyalties from: the thing called “religion.”6
In tune with this theoretical trend, this article proceeds from the premise that
the modern state is a more demanding state, that the nature of liberty such a
state affords is not permissive in absolute terms, but only in relation to other
authorities that compete with its own claims over its subjects. But I also
think, perhaps somewhat differently from Asad, that greater attention needs
to be paid to the manner in which the modern state claims authority to regulate,
rather than marginalize, religious afﬁliation. In 1894–1895, for example,
Hungary (to cite one of the few studies of civil marriage laws anywhere in
the world) legislated compulsory civil marriage, with the children of “mixed
marriages” (i.e., born of parents belonging to different churches) required to
register as belonging to the confession of the parent of their same sex. By com-
pelling the registration of both marriages and births, and by making the state’s
authority transcendent in determining individual religious identity, the Hungar-
ian nation-state explicitly demolished the competing claims of its most formid-
able rival, the Catholic Church.7 I see clear similarities between the Hungarian
5 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, 2003), 181–
201. Asad has also pointed out that “institutional differentiation” means radically different policies
in countries such as the United States and France. In “Responses,” in David Scott and Charles
Hirschkind, eds., Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford,
2006), 207–10.
6 Talal Asad, “French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair,’” Hedgehog Review 8, 1–2
(2006): 93–106, at 4. In my reading, a similar argument is made by Veena Das with respect to
the British imperial state in India, in her “Secularism and the Argument from Nature,” in Scott
and Hirschkind, eds., Powers of the Secular Modern, 93–112.
7 Robert Nemes, “The Uncivil Origins of Civil Marriage: Hungary,” in Christopher Clark and
Wolfram Kaiser, eds., Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conﬂict in Nineteenth-Century Europe
(Cambridge, 2003), 313–35.
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law and those in Britain and India; all were passed in the same century and each
was an instance of the modern state (nation-state or imperial state) successfully
claiming supreme authority over the regulation of religious afﬁliation. State
secularism does not imply the withdrawal of the state from religious matters,
but on the contrary it consists of the state assuming the role of the ultimate reg-
ulator of religious afﬁliations and arbiter of religious claims.8
What, then, about state secularism in British-ruled colonial India? A large
number of postcolonial scholars have asserted that India is a society where reli-
gions are total ways of life that cannot be validly differentiated to yield a pure
secular sphere of social life, ethics, and politics.9 From this perspective, state
secularism in colonial India was purely the effect of the modernizing will of
an arbitrary and alien state, a will that “westernized” Indian ruling elites
have continued to adopt under the postcolonial dispensations. If this is so,
then one could explain the appearance of a civil marriage law in India in
1872 as an unremarkable symptom of the general Britain-led modernization
program there.
Apart from serious doubts regarding Britain’s commitment to modernizing
colonial India,10 there is a relatively recent suspicion that this chronology
itself is incorrect, that Britain may not have been “modern” in time to “moder-
nize” India (however inadequately). If, on the other hand, “modernity,” both
8 There is an argument that by the nineteenth century, religious difference ceased to matter, or
matter much, for European states, which became increasingly preoccupied with racial distinctions
instead. See Peter van der Veer, Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain
(Princeton, 2001), 22. But religion and race are not quite the mutually exclusive ontological cat-
egories that they are often taken to be. Not only is there is a clear genealogical connection
between these two taxonomic systems, but there have been constant exchanges between them,
especially in the context of European and European-imperial law from the eighteenth century
until today. I have argued this in connection with a case in Calcutta in 1756; see Nandini Chatterjee,
“Religious Change, Social Conﬂict and Legal Competition: The Emergence of Christian Personal
Law in Colonial India,” Modern Asian Studies (doi:10.1017/S0026749X09990394 published
online by Cambridge University Press, 21 April 2010). In my understanding, Nazi Germany’s anti-
miscegenation laws were the direct descendents of nineteenth-century Prussian laws aimed at dis-
couraging “inappropriate” religious choices, that is, conversion to Judaism. Christopher Clark, “The
Limits of the Confessional State: Conversions to Judaism in Prussia 1814–1843,” Past and Present
147 (May 1995): 159–79. One can detect the same conceptual contortions in the House of Lords’
discovery (in Mandla [Seva Singh] and another v. Dowell Lee and others [1983], 2 AC 548) that
Sikhs were a “race” rather than a “religion,” as they had been deemed until then, a discovery
that enabled them to extend protection under the Race Relations Act 1976 to Gurinder Singh
Mandla, excluded from a private school for insisting on wearing his turban.
9 T. N. Madan, “Whither Indian Secularism?” Modern Asian Studies 27, 3 (1993): 667–97;
Ashish Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance,” in Rajeev
Bhargava, ed., Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi, 1998), 321–44.
10 David Washbrook has most strongly proposed that British rule “traditionalized” India rather
than the other way round. In “India, 1818–1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism,” in Andrew Porter,
ed., Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1999), 395–421. Most scholars subscribe
to the view that British enthusiasm for reform and modernization wore off after the debacle of the
Mutiny of 1857, and with the rising conviction in the incorrigibility of inferior races in Victorian
Britain.
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Britain’s and India’s, was the product of the interaction itself,11 then one needs
to accord greater causative weight to the interactive process. This is what this
article does, at the micro-level of laws dealing with marriage and religious
status.
I will argue that the civil marriage laws of Britain and India were products of
a distinctively modern legal approach towards religious toleration, which arbi-
trated between rather than ignored religious difference, and in the process of
doing so engendered a novel species of political competition in colonial
India. This competition consisted of collective claims asserted to be religious
and accepted as such by the state. A host of scholars have commented on the
unprecedented hardening of religious and other ascriptive social boundaries
in India under colonial rule, and here we can trace the actual process of redirec-
tion of competition from other social fora toward the state, and the resultant
re-articulation of social identities in law as well as the public sphere. A
crucial, but by no means omnipotent role was played in this process by the
colonial state, which through the very fact of declaring a policy of religious
“neutrality” committed itself to the identiﬁcation of religious “rights” borne
by entities known as religious communities. The situation was in many ways
unprecedented, but it also possessed sufﬁcient commonalities with recent reli-
gious and legal developments in Britain for British legislators in India to adopt
models derived from Britain to resolve the competing claims in India. By
tracing how the process produced two formally similar but substantively differ-
ent civil marriage laws, in Britain and India, I will showcase the process of law-
making in colonial India, and add to the historiography of the modern state and
its relation to religion.
I will also speak, though less directly, to how ties of kinship, affection, and
authority were restructured, a process that in the nineteenth century produced
the modern bourgeois family in Britain, and to a limited extent in India as
well. I will suggest some reasons why that model of interpersonal relationships
found only limited and delayed success in India. In doing so, I will highlight
differences in legal structure and political competition rather than cultural spe-
ciﬁcities such as an innate Indian tendency towards unwieldy extended families
and arranged marriages.
11 This has been argued for some time now, for example in Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Con-
quest: Literary Studies and British Rule in India (London, 1990); Peter van der Veer, Imperial
Encounters; and more recently by Jon Wilson in The Domination of Strangers: Modern Govern-
ance in Eastern India, 1780–1835 (Basingstoke, 2008). These scholars however deﬁne this
co-emergent “modernity” in different ways. While van der Veer and Viswanathan point toward
its “known” aspects, such as secularism, Wilson reverts to classical social theory in deﬁning it as
abstraction, of law, policy, and even people’s self-perceptions, from the lived reality of social
life. Also, Wilson’s modernity is much more universal, affecting Indians and Britons alike,
whereas Viswanathan and van der Veer have both argued for the continued existence of social
and intellectual formations outside of modernity.
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C O L O N I A L C I V I L I T Y: A N A L I E N I M P O S I T I O N ?
Recently a minor piece of colonial Indian legislation known the Special Mar-
riage Act, legislated in 1872 as Act III of that year, has emerged from obscurity
due to the attentions of scholars interested in the triangle of law, religion and
marriage.12 Ofﬁcially titled “An Act to Provide a Form of Marriage in
Certain Cases,” the Special Marriage Act has come to be seen as India’s ﬁrst
civil marriage law,13 and, with several amendments, it is the current law as
well. Scholars have noted certain irregularities in the history of this law of
the sort that historians delight in explaining. It was a law that was condemned
by its opponents as revolutionary, but which also failed to satisfy its propo-
nents, to the extent that its principal advocate, an eccentric and charismatic
Indian religious leader called Keshub Chandra Sen, was himself party to its vio-
lation within seven years of its passing. Why, then, was this law enacted at all?
In the most immediate terms, the process of legislation commenced with
Keshub Chandra Sen making a petition in 1868 to the Government of India
on behalf of the Brahmo Samaj for a law that would secure the legality of
Brahmo marriages.14 The Samaj was an association, principally of upper
caste Bengali Hindus, committed to the “reform” of religious doctrine, forms
of worship, and social mores, one among various such socio-religious reform
efforts that proliferated in nineteenth-century India.15 It was established in
1828 by Raja Rammohan Roy, “the father of modern India” in nationalist
hagiography. A near outcast to many of his contemporaries, he has been
recently reappraised as one of the earliest constitutional liberals of India.16
From the start, the Brahmo Samaj’s members demonstrated ambivalence
about the social implications of religious reform that affected all religious
reform movements in India, from long before the colonial period. Over time,
the Samaj adopted a sanitized (non-idolatrous) worship and marriage ritual,
and from the 1860s it was associated with a miniscule number of unorthodox
marriages between men and women of different castes, and in some cases,
involving widowed women. It was in this context that Keshub, the leader of
12 I am principally referring to Perveez Mody’s “Love and the Law: Love-Marriage in Delhi,”
Modern Asian Studies 36: 1 (2002): 223–56; re-stated in, “A Form of Marriage in Certain Cases,” in
her The Intimate State: Love-Marriage and the Law in Delhi (London, 2008), 61–102; and Rochona
Majumdar, Marriage and Modernity: Family Values in Colonial Bengal (Durham and London,
2009), 167–205. I will refer to earlier discussions of the law, presently.
13 Erroneously so, since the ﬁrst law to permit civil marriage in India was passed in 1851, but
was limited to marriages where at least one partner was Christian. I will discuss that law, below.
14 Minute by Henry Maine on the Bill to legalize marriages between certain Natives of India not
professing the Christian religion, Government of India Legislative Proceedings 1868, 19 Sept., nos.
15–16, 277–82, P/436/55, Asia Paciﬁc and Africa Collections, British Library.
15 Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, New Cambridge
History of India, III, 1 (Cambridge, 1989).
16 C. A. Bayly, “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India, 1800–
30,” Modern Intellectual History 4, 1 (2007): 25–41.
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the Brahmo Samaj, questioned the Advocate General of India regarding the val-
idity of such marriages, and being informed of their fragile legal status, peti-
tioned for an appropriate law.
Mody’s study of the history of the Special Marriage Act takes the view that
Keshub’s petition was an appeal for recognition of Brahmos as a “distinct ‘com-
munity,’ with legitimate rites of marriage,” an appeal whose speciﬁcs, and ulti-
mately whose essence was ignored by British legislators. According to Mody,
the latter were keen to create a “civil marriage law for all Indians, so that
those choosing to dissent from the religious practices of their marriage rites
could ﬁnd state sanction for their acts even if they were disowned by their
families, caste or ethno-religious communities.”17 Even with the quotation
marks, the idea that Brahmos were a deﬁnite and bounded collective, a religious
community, appealing for its rights to a secular and insensitive colonial govern-
ment, informs the chapter of legal history in Mody’s otherwise rich and nuanced
study of north Indian “love-marriages” (She uses this Indian-English colloquial
term to deﬁne marriages based on individual choice rather than “social choice,”
as represented by the wishes of the families.) Through an impressive legal ethno-
graphy conducted over several years in the Indian capital of Delhi, Mody exam-
ines the implication of the contemporary (ofﬁcially modern and secular) Indian
nation-state in the enforcement of socio-religious orthodoxy, and the dominant
(“metropolitan”) view of legitimate marriage. As she convincingly demonstrates,
the state is implicated by its failure to protect the individual liberty it proclaims,
such that vigilantism ﬂourishes with impunity, and also by the deterrence exer-
cised by the working of an administrative and legal system in which lower-level
functionaries are personally biased against “love-marriage.”18 In the broader
context of Mody’s monograph, the purpose of the chapter on legal history is
to establish a historical genealogy for the divergence between dominant Indian
social norms and formal legal principles, a divergence that remains rife with
potential for repression of individuality but also for its rebellious expression.19
Mody suggests that the reason that the government, and particularly the law
member Henry Maine, took the expansive route to marriage legislation was
Maine’s evolutionary vision of society proceeding from status to contract,
such that “marriages arranged by caste and kinship would give way to mar-
riages based on individual contract.” His vision, according to Mody, encom-
passed a view that religious afﬁliation should be a matter of individual
choice, an idea that she believes to be symptomatic of secularization and loss
of faith among intellectuals within Europe.20 This is a somewhat inaccurate
17 Mody, “Love and the Law,” 223.
18 Ibid., 223–56 (re-stated in Mody, “A Form of Marriage,” 61–102).
19 Ibid., 62–64.
20 Ibid., 228, 230. Mody repeats the view that the primary reason for this legislation was to be
found in a British modernization program for India, in The Intimate State, 80.
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treatment of Maine’s ideas and its effects on imperial policy.21 Mody also relies
excessively on Louis Dumont to explain Indian abhorrence for notions of indi-
vidual sexual-emotional and religious autonomy that are apparently inseparable
from civil marriage.22
In line with the rest of her argument, Mody describes Indians, or rather
Indian religious “communities,” as having vociferously resisted such an idea
of marriage and personhood, such that the colonial state was forced to add a
self-excommunication clause, according to which couples marrying under
this law had to declare that they did not profess the “Christian, Jewish,
Hindu, Muhammadan, Parsi, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jaina religions.”23 In case
the threat of “excommunication” was not enough, deterrent administrative pro-
visions were added, such as the requirement of an extended residence in the dis-
trict of marriage (two weeks in 1872, extended to thirty days in 1954). These
made it nearly impossible for eloping couples exercising individual choice to
use the law, when their families could pursue and effectively deter them.
Although in 1954 the amended Act did not include the excommunication
clause, due to the promotion of “individual” rights by (presumably wester-
nized) Indian constitution-makers such as Dr. Ambedkar, the law remains
barely usable because of universal social disapproval and the barriers created
by administrative law.24
Mody argues that this law, unloved by most Indians, was essentially the
product of “a secularizing impulse in colonial matrimonial legislation,” a
powerful impulse that remained active among the “avant-garde” leaders of
post-colonial India, especially the discordantly paired Jawaharlal Nehru and
B. R. Ambedkar. This view is shared by Majumdar, who sweepingly suggests,
“[All?] marriage laws in colonial India bore the stamp of this tussle between a
secularized notion of law and a ritualized performance of community
identity.”25
21 In general, Maine’s identity as a liberal modernizer has long been discarded. Scholars have
pointed out that while he postulated that all progressive societies had “hitherto” moved from
status to contract, he thought that this trajectory was historically speciﬁc, and certainly did not
predict nor recommend that all societies would embark upon the same journey. John W. Burrow,
“Henry Maine and Mid-Victorian Ideas of Progress,” in Alan Diamond, ed., The Victorian Achieve-
ment of Sir Henry Maine (Cambridge, 1991), 55–69. In fact, Maine’s thoughts lent themselves to
the ideology of imperial conservatism that characterized late Victorian colonial governance in India.
See Clive Dewey, “The Inﬂuence of Sir Henry Maine on Agrarian Policy in India,” in ibid., 351–75.
C. A. Bayly has also suggested that Maine-derived conservatism was particularly successful in
India because it resonated with Indian nationalist conservatism at the end of the nineteenth
century. C.A. Bayly, “Maine and Change in Nineteenth-Century India,” in ibid., 389–97. Also
see Karuna Mantena, “The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism,” in Duncan Bell, ed., Victorian Visions
of the Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political
Thought (Cambridge, 2007), 113–35.
22 Mody, “Love and the Law,” 224–27.
23 Act III of 1872, s. 2, and Schedule II.
24 Mody, “Love and the Law,” 240–41.
25 Majumdar, Marriage and Modernity, 167–70.
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I disagree with the broader argument of these two scholars, who would
characterize non-European modernity as an import or imposition, except
where modernity takes alternative forms, inevitably marked by exotic ceremo-
nial, and also inevitably performed in the inner or private sphere, which, as
Partha Chatterjee famously suggested, was the creative realm of indigenous
anti-colonial nationalisms.26 The non-western post-colonial state deserves a
richer history than that which emerges if it is stereotyped as the cast-off machin-
ery of imperial domination; much that is universal about Indian modernity also
derives from a unique province of the historical past, just as is the case with
European modernities.
To see Keshub’s petition for a separate law of marriage as equivalent to a
Brahmo demand for recognition as a distinct collective religious community,
and to explain the ultimately abstract and universal form of the law as the
product of secular ideologies, pursued ﬁrst by British colonial statesmen, and
subsequently by “avant-garde” postcolonial Indian leaders, one has to
commit oneself to two a priori assumptions: ﬁrst that there was a “modern”
British distaste for legally recognizing stable and bounded social groupings,
including religious communities, and second, that the Brahmos were in fact
such a stable and bounded collective deﬁned by their religion, even if they dis-
agreed occasionally about who belonged. I will argue that neither proposition is
defensible.
To begin with the British, I will argue that from the perspective of British
legislators the Special Marriage Act was an explicit effort to accommodate col-
lective religious difference, rather than an expression of universalistic prin-
ciples of individual liberty. Further, such an effort was partly derived from
the nature of nineteenth-century British marital legislations, which, inciden-
tally, were as much about religious rites and rights of religious communities
as about the rights of parties to a marriage. It also derived from the speciﬁcally
imperial policy of recognizing and administering a system of personal laws, or
religion-based “family laws,” that had been developing in colonial India since
the late eighteenth century.
As for the Brahmos, they provide not just a representative, but a dispropor-
tionately important case on which to test theories about the origins of marriage
legislations in colonial India, and the nature of Indian religious “communities,”
deﬁned, or seeking to be deﬁned, by their personal laws—the laws of family
life, property, and religion. As Mody and Majumdar both recognize, the
Special Marriage Act was tremendously divisive for the Brahmos above all.
The proposal for legislation immediately alienated Debendranath Tagore’s
more conservative Adi Brahmo Samaj from the Keshub-led section, and a
further split followed between the “radically progressive” Sadharan Brahmo
26 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, 2d ed.
(New Delhi, 1995), 1–13.
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Samaj and Keshub’s Nababidhan, or New Dispensation. Were these divisions
the result of an unwanted and rigid law being imposed on unsuspecting
Brahmos by the British, or were they already extant, but pushed further
using ammunition actively sought from the state by particular sections of the
so-called Brahmo “community”? In other words, did the community and the
state really inhabit different and mutually antagonistic spheres? Let us begin
by examining the British side of the story.
A G E N E R A L E X P L A N AT I O N O F C I V I L MA R R I A G E ? B R I TA I N I N
T H E N I N E T E E N T H C E N T U RY
Scholars often point to Luther’s recommendation that marriage be seen as a
civil contract rather than a sacrament as an originary moment for civil mar-
riage27 (thus sustaining the larger argument that Protestantism led to seculariza-
tion). But this presents a problem in that the two or three intervening centuries
until civil marriage really became possible in different European countries must
be seen as a mere waiting period. Furthermore, it does nothing to explain the
differences between the laws of different countries. Consider England in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: unless one was a Quaker or a
Jew, one could only be legally married in Anglican church, by an Anglican
priest, with full Anglican rites. This applied equally to Nonconformists,
Roman Catholics, and non-Christians. Thus Din Muhammad, a Bengali
Muslim ex-sepoy who traveled to Britain in the nineteenth century and set
up a vigorous medico-cosmetic business in “shampooing,” married an Irish
Protestant woman called Jane Daly in 1786 in an Anglican church. His biogra-
pher assumes that Muhammad would have by this time become Christian,28 a
supposition strengthened by his later decision to have his son baptized. But
there is no evidence that he had actually changed his religion, and that he
married a second time around 1806 would indicate that he certainly did not
take all Christian doctrines seriously. But the question for us here is whether
he had to be Christian to marry in an Anglican church.29 It appears to me
that he did not, and in fact there was no other legal method by which Jane
could have married him in British-ruled Ireland. This was because Lord Hard-
wicke’s Act of 1753 (26 Geo. II c. 23) outlawed all marriages not duly cele-
brated, ministered, and registered in an Anglican church or chapel, with ﬁve
exceptions: the Archbishop’s license, royal marriages, marriages abroad
27 Olive Anderson, “The Incidence of Civil Marriage,” 77, esp. n. 45.
28 The Travels of Dean Mahomet: An Eighteenth-Century Journey through India, Michael
H. Fischer, ed. (Berkeley, 1997), 209.
29 Professor Fisher called my attention to the fact that the couple had to declare themselves
members of the congregation. But he also agreed that there were pious Muslims who married Chris-
tians in church (personal communication, 15 Apr. 2008). One such person was Mir Hasan Ali,
whose English wife later undertook an ethnography of Indian Muslim customs. Mrs. Meer
Hasan Ali, Observations on the Mussulmans of India (London, 1832).
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(provided such marriage were celebrated by a law that recognized Christian
marriage), marriages between Jews, and between Quakers.30 Din Muhammad
would not have qualiﬁed for any of these exemptions.31
Let us examine what was happening here in mid-eighteenth-century Britain.
The 1753 law did not separate the church and the state, but rather bolstered the
authority of the Anglican Church far beyond the capacity of the church itself.
As before, canon law remained the only form of marriage law, and ecclesiasti-
cal courts continued to possess near-exclusive jurisdiction over matrimonial
disputes.32 The Anglican Church continued to function as an arm of the
state, levying tithes for the functions of parish governance, including poor
relief. With the 1753 law, the connection became even closer, with the
church serving the modern state’s aims of creating a legible and governable
population, but also its own, securing compliance to a degree it had never
achieved before.33
Did “secularization” happen in England in 1837 then, when the ﬁrst civil
marriage law came into force? This law permitted three possible locations
and forms of marriage: an Anglican church by Anglican rites (preceded by
banns, license, or the registrar’s license), in a registered Nonconformist
chapel or Roman Catholic church by appropriate rites in the presence of a regis-
trar, and at the registrar’s ofﬁce without religious ceremonies. Both the latter
forms had to be preceded by the issuing of a license or certiﬁcate by the regis-
trar.34 This tri-fold categorization—which was based on and explicitly referred
to the nature of religious rites employed—resists any religious-secular typol-
ogy: Anglican church marriages could follow both religious and civil prelimin-
aries, the chapel marriage had to be preceded by civil license. This hardly made
religion irrelevant to the state; the law offered a limited set of religious choices,
which were unequally distributed. As Nonconformists continued to complain,
marriage in a chapel remained more difﬁcult, more expensive, and not auto-
matically valid; not until 1898 could the presence of the registrar be dispensed
30 H.S.Q. Henriques, “Jewish Marriages and the English Law,” 400.
31 The irony was that while mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants were prohibited
in Ireland until 1792 under the penal laws, Din Muhammad, might have slipped through the net by
belonging to neither category.
32 The provision for a private bill of divorce in Parliament, available since the Tudors, was for
obvious reasons not a substantive reality for most people. Other causes, such as enforcing a mar-
riage contract (rather than dissolving it) remained under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. For the
working of ecclesiastical courts for matrimonial disputes prior to 1857, before the ﬁrst civil
courts for divorce were created, see R. H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England
(London, 1974).
33 While “informal marriage,” which was not only outside the church but often no more than a
verbal promise, was valid if made in the present tense, “per verba de presenti,” it was difﬁcult to
establish in dispute, and hence discouraged by the church. By the sixteenth century, the presence of
priest began to be considered crucially important, but even so, verbal contracts remained legally
enforceable until 1753. Ibid., 64–65.
34 6 and 7 Will. IV c. 85.
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with for churches in Nonconformist and Roman Catholic marriages.35 This
point can be extended today to the registration of Hindu and Muslim marriages,
the difﬁculties of Nonconformists being almost exactly replicated with regard
to the unsure legal status of non-Christian religious functionaries or of build-
ings that are not registered for performance of marriages.36 It appears that in
Britain since 1837, until today, “choice” has indeed been extended in the
realm of marriage laws, but different kinds of religious choices still result in
different status in law.
I N D I A’ S F I R S T C I V I L M A R R I A G E L AW, 1 85 1–1 85 2
If the British civil marriage law was part of a state effort to accommodate reli-
gious variety rather than ignore it, the law’s extension to India in 1851 was
marked by exponentially heightened awareness of the signiﬁcance of religious
differences. As in Britain, the claim of Nonconformists to conduct valid mar-
riages without submitting to Anglican rites and ministry led to the legislation
of India’s ﬁrst law of civil marriage.37 As in Britain, Anglican authorities
vocally opposed this law, and as in Britain they were unsuccessful in preventing
the law being passed.38 However, the outcome was quite different in India.
There, because of the existence of other, Hindu and Muslim marriage laws
recognized by the British government, the civil marriage law was restricted
in application only to Christians. This formed the confused racial-religious
core of the future “Christian personal law.” A brief look at this process will
indicate the manner in which the Indian “personal laws” formed an intercon-
nected grid of competing jurisdictions, such that any proposed legislation in
the ﬁeld of domestic relationships was bound to encroach on the territory
claimed by existing laws and their defenders.
Following more than a decade of petitions on the subject, in 1851 the British
Parliament decided that there was an urgent need to extend the 1836 civil mar-
riage law to India. Although Nonconformist ministers in India had submitted
several petitions requesting such legislation (The Metropolitan, Bishop
Daniel Wilson opposed it), the scales were tipped by the case of Maclean vs.
Christall in the Supreme Court of Bombay in 1849. This was in essence a
divorce case, although in form it consisted of the husband, Captain Maclean,
seeking damages for “criminal conversation” from his wife’s lover, a certain
35 Roderick Floude and Pat Thane “Debate: The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian
England and Wales,” Past and Present 84 (Aug. 1979): 146–54, at 148–52.
36 David Pearl, “MuslimMarriages in English Law,” English Law Journal 30, 1 (1972): 120–43,
at 130.
37 Act III of 1872 was not the ﬁrst civil marriage law legislated by the British in India.
38 In particular see Daniel Wilson, Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India. See Second
Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the State and Operation of the Law of Mar-
riage, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons 1850 (1203), XX.363.
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Mr. Christall.39 The defendant’s lawyer argued that by English law, speciﬁcally
after Lord Hardwicke’s statute of 1753, no marriage was valid unless a priest in
holy orders ofﬁciated; in this case, the marriage was performed by a Congrega-
tionalist missionary, hence no marriage existed and no adultery could have
taken place. He referred to an English case from 1842, Regina v. Millis, in
which a husband argued a similar claim of non-existence of a ﬁrst marriage
when he married a second time. The judges refused to accept this precedent,
correctly predicting that such a judgment would void most Christian marriages
in India, where priests were few and far apart, and “bastardize” the children.
The judges argued that the 1753 statute had never been introduced in
India,40 but resort to judicial discretion on a matter of such broad signiﬁcance
revealed an urgent need for explicit legislation.
Since English statutes did not automatically apply to India (or to Scotland for
that matter), Acts 14 and 15 Vic. Cap. XL of 1851, entitled an “An Act for Mar-
riages in India,” was enacted by the British Parliament and given effect by the
Indian Act V of 1852, which provided for valid marriage before a registrar
without religious ceremonies. Unlike the British law, it did not encompass
the large majority of church marriages, whether Anglican, Roman Catholic,
or Church of Scotland.41 The key point for this paper is that the Indian law
began its career endowed with explicit confessional boundaries: its application
was limited to Christians. This jurisdictional criterion was a revelation of the
persistent failure of British imperial law to differentiate between “natives”
and other “British subjects” in non-confessional terms; “Christian” was code
for a category that could only be deﬁned in negation: “non-native.”42 But
every taxonomic system has its own moment of force, hence the law did
apply to some “natives”: the “Native Christians,” and thus formed the ﬁrst of
the statutes comprised in the future Christian personal law.43 This was not
because British jurists thought Christianity made a person “British,” or
because they were unaware of the cultural difference between British and
Indian Christians, but simply because they had no conceptual tools suitably
“de-confessionalized” (secularized, if you like), to deﬁne persons without refer-
ence to religion, in the context of marriage.44 Since polygamy was at this time
39 Once adultery was proved, the wronged husband could seek a private bill for divorce in the
British Parliament, the only method for a complete divorce in England before 1857. Ecclesiastical
courts could only offer separation from “bed and board,” divorce a mensa e thoro, although com-
plete nulliﬁcations of marriage were available on grounds that the marriage did not ever exist.
40 Maclean v. Christall, Indian Decisions (Old Series), 17 vols. (Madras, 1912), v. 4, 69–83.
41 Clause 24, Act Vof 1852. Later, Act Vof 1865 superseded this law, providing for civil as well
as church marriages, for Christians.
42 Throughout its proceedings, the Commission recognized the existence of a much larger
pertinent issue, the legal regulation of Indian Christian marriages, but its ﬁnal report declared
such concerns beyond its competence.
43 For a history of the Indian Christian personal law, see Chatterjee, “Religious Change.”
44 By Clauses 7 and 12, Act V of 1852.
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legally permitted to all other Indian men, a Christianity-derived law that com-
pulsorily enjoined monogamy could obviously not apply to them. British
jurists, understandably perhaps, refused to reﬂect on the academic possibility
of a non-Christian Indian man choosing to bind himself legally to monogamy.
Imposing this jurisdictional limitation on a law that was “after all” intended for
British expatriates may appear commonsensical, but we will see how, through a
similar process of turf-protecting by the personal laws and their advocates, a
second civil marriage law intended potentially for all Indians was to be still
further restricted in applicability.
The trajectory of the ﬁrst civil marriage law of India alerts us, among other
things, to the way in which a religious-legal tradition may be created.45 Scho-
lars have commented on the distortion involved in transforming sharī`a into the
inelegantly named “Anglo-Muhammadan law,” such that a generalized moral-
spiritual code and system of jurisprudence was limited in jurisdiction to a few
“private” matters for a select group.46 But the transformation of the English
civil marriage law into a “personal law” in India shows that very similar
things could happen to British law in contexts that forced limitation of jurisdic-
tion. With sharī`a in India, scholars are unanimous that colonial state action
produced this limitation, but what forced the British civil marriage law to
limit itself to a tiny proportion of people residing in India?
I N D I A’ S P E R S O N A L L AW S : R E L I G I O U S L AW A S C I V I L / S TAT E L AW
The easiest answer to that question is “religion,” or the speciﬁc “Indian reli-
gions,” namely Hinduism and Islam, since it was ofﬁcial British colonial
policy not to interfere in Indian religions. A more speciﬁc reason is the
unevenly adopted imperial policy of preserving and administering indigenous
laws. This limited the extent to which British laws could be applied in India,
producing very different effects for laws formally very similar to each other,
such as the (British) Marriage Act of 1836, and the Act for Marriages in
India, 1851. However, from the late eighteenth century, when this legal
policy was adopted, the realm of indigenous laws lessened by constant attrition,
until in the mid-nineteenth century it only implied the recognition of Hindu and
Muslim laws of private relations, including laws regulating marriage and
divorce, inheritance and succession, guardianship of minors, caste disputes,
and religious endowments.47 The Indian “personal laws” encompassed more
than the cluster that came to be called “family laws” under Western welfare
regimes, and they were (and remain) a species of private law, dealing with
45 For the subsequent history of “Christian personal law” in India, see Chatterjee, “Religious
Change.”
46 Among others, Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian
Islam since 1850 (Lahore, 2001), 139–52.
47 It formally included contract until 1872, however.
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matters of interpersonal concern, but only matters of affect, which were
believed not to interfere with the functioning of the state or the market. As
such, the substantive law could vary with the particular religion that purported
to be the source of a particular personal law, as well as the basis of the litigant’s
legal capacity. For example, if parties were Hindu, the disputes would be dealt
with under Hindu law,48 provided the dispute involved marriage, divorce, or
some other cause over which the personal laws had jurisdiction. Thus they
were distinct from laws universally applicable within the territory of British
India, which were the lex loci.49 Looked at from the other direction, the per-
sonal laws were inescapable when disputes fell within their jurisdiction, and
since the application of a personal law depended on ascertaining the parties’
religious afﬁliation, in such cases a lack of religious identity was simply not
(and still is not) an option.50 So when in fact certain people, such as the
Parsis or the Indian Christians, failed to ﬁt the available categories, they
revealed a jurisdictional vacuum that had to be quickly ﬁlled by the discovery
of further personal laws.
The inception of this legal policy is commonly attributed to Warren Hast-
ings’ judicial plan of 1772, which was formulated to overhaul Bengal’s admin-
istration and allow the East India Company to directly undertake its rights and
duties as the Mughal diwan, and it is usually considered the moment of origin
for the Indian personal laws.51 Clause XXIII of this plan, which ostensibly
aimed to restore an ancient “Mogul constitution,” declared, “That in all suits
regarding inheritance, marriage and caste and other religious usages and insti-
tutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to Mahomedans and those of the
48 In cases where the parties were of different religions, the laws of the defendant applied. This
provision was a fruitful source of judicial confusion, leading, among other things, to the codiﬁcation
of two additional personal laws, the Parsi and the (Indian) Christian.
49 A retired Calcutta Supreme Court judge explained this to the Royal Society of Arts in 1941.
G. C. Rankin, “The Personal Law in British India,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 89 (May
1941): 426–42. J.D.M. Derrett explored the persistent complexities this produced in determining
the applicable law of, among other things, inheritable property, in “Private International Law and
Personal Laws (based on Duggamma versus Ganeshayya), International Comparative Law Quar-
terly 14: 4 (1965): 1370–75.
50 As Marc Galanter explains, the deﬁnition of “religious identity” is in reality a description of
civil status, not of religious belief or social behavior. “Hinduism, Secularism and the Judiciary,” in
Law and Society in Modern India (New Delhi, 1997), 237–58, at 241. Similarly, a person is
assumed to be Muslim if his or her father is Muslim, unless he or she explicitly renounces the
faith. Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 4th ed. (New Delhi, 1999), 60–64.
51 In 1765, the East India Company defeated an Indian coalition, which included the Mughal
emperor. The defeated emperor granted the Company the diwani, or revenue-collection rights for
the suba or Mughal province of Bengal. Until 1772, the Company tried to let the tremendous
duties of collecting information and taxes, as well as the dispensation of civil justice, all of
which was encompassed within diwani, be administered by the Mughal ofﬁcials in situ. In 1772,
following a severe famine and near-bankruptcy of the Company, it was decided to take over the
functions directly. Among others, see P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead (Cambridge,
1987), 70–92; Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in
Bengal (Cambridge, 2007), 118–23.
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Shaster with respect to Gentoos shall be invariably adhered to.” The purported
sources of these laws were religious traditions; initially sought by consulting
Muslim and Hindu experts.52 Initial unquestioning reliance by the British
judges on “native” experts for discovering what the Hindu and Muslim laws
consisted of, quickly gave way to suspicion of such authorities. The earliest
cadre of British Orientalists in India consisted most often of judges attempting
to locate and translate the sources of Indian law unhampered by the obfusca-
tions of suspect Indian experts, and supplementing their labors by building
up a coherent body of case law that lent itself to consistent decisions in the
manner of common law.53
Notwithstanding the ofﬁcial view of this policy as the preservation of indigen-
ous laws, and by extension, of religion (since these two were supposed to be con-
ﬂated in Indian tradition), scholars studying the Indian personal laws as a system
have pointed out that, in fact, procedurally, substantively, and ideologically a new
approach to law was being initiated.54 Inevitably, because of the conﬂation of law
and religion, this was also a novel approach to the management of religious
diversity. As Robert Travers has noted, whereas the Mughals had conceived of
adjudication as a process distributed at various levels of society, the new
system took the state to be the ultimate source of both rights and justice.55
The new state-centrism, combined with the effort to be “tolerant” of religious
difference, meant that the new colonial government could not permit its juris-
diction to be fractured in the manner of the Mughal legal system. All that hap-
pened had to happen within a notionally uniﬁed system of law and courts, all
deriving authority from the state. This legal approach created explicitly reli-
gious civil laws that were administered only by the state. The personal laws
were from inception state laws: they did not represent the granting of legal
autonomy to a limited religious sphere, but rather an active undertaking by
the state to dispense religion as right.
This novel state project of administering multiple religious laws led to a new
kind of “legal politics” in India. Contests that had once been played out in differ-
ent social contexts were now redirected as claims on the state. Since neither
52 J.D.M. Derrett, “The Administration of Hindu Law by the British,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 4, 1 (1961): 10–52, at 26.
53 Ibid., 32–34. Some important accounts of such translation projects, aimed at producing Hindu
and Muslim law digests for the reference of British judges incapable of consulting the original
sources are: J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, 2d ed. (Delhi, 1999), 225–
320; and Michael R. Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter,” in Peter Robb and
David Arnold, eds., Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asia Reader (London, 1993),
165–85. Long after such digests became available, however, British judges sought to discover
the law (not just clarify it) in difﬁcult cases by posing questions to their Hindu or Muslim law ofﬁ-
cers. See, for example, the report of the caseGouree Pershaud Rai versus Musst Jymala, decided by
the Sadr Diwani Adalat, Calcutta, in 1804. Indian Decisions (Old Series) (1912), vol. 4, 491–93.
The posts of Hindu and Muslim law ofﬁcers were ofﬁcially abolished in 1864.
54 Derrett, “Administration of Hindu Law,” 34–37.
55 Travers, Ideology and Empire, 118–23.
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Hindu nor Muslim law was codiﬁed in the colonial period,56 the proposition that
the state would administer these laws inevitably led to collective competition
between Indian elites determined to instruct the state on what those laws were.
Such competition was directly connected to concerns with maintaining or con-
structing particular patterns of interpersonal relationships, especially within
families, from which derived a variety of material and non-material entitlements,
such as shares in property or authority over subordinates. Any “resistance” to
legislation in personal law matters was then a claim for alternative state action
in favor of an alternative social vision, through legal declaration of or judicial
enforcement of constantly discovered orthodoxies. Despite the rhetoric, there
was actually little effort to exclude the state, especially in its judicial avatar,
from an inner sphere of domesticity, religion, and the nation.57
K E S H U B C H AND R A S E N ’ S A P P E A L F O R A L AW P R E S E RV I N G
T H E MA R R I A G E O F B R A HMO S , 1 8 6 8
It is now time to return to our principal protagonists, the Brahmos, and the
reasons for Keshub’s appeal for a law to validate their unorthodox marriages.
Mody sees this as a request by Brahmos to be recognized as a “distinct ‘com-
munity’ with legitimate rites of marriage,” an appeal which was ignored by the
colonial state, which instead introduced civil marriage, based on a more “indi-
vidualistic conception of marriage based on the conjugal couple.”58
But is this what happened? To begin with, the description of Brahmos as a
distinct religious community sits uneasily with this law’s divisive impact on
the Samaj itself, which has long been recognized by scholars working on the
Samaj. The divisions were over a number of key issues, and I would argue
that the “self-excommunication” clause in the Special Marriage Act was the
least important, although it was the best face-saving excuse for Brahmo conser-
vatives. They had more material reasons for disliking a law which would in
effect be a public test of their ﬁdelity to the community’s reformist ideals,
since it set a minimum age of fourteen for the bride (with her guardian’s
consent) and eighteen for the groom, which would quite simply dash any
hopes that Brahmo fathers might have entertained of marrying their daughters
into orthodox Hindu families. In addition, their daughters’ attractions in the
broader Hindu marriage market would be signiﬁcantly compromised by the
56 Digests were compiled, however, which in the common law tradition were sources of prin-
ciples, and less reliable than either precedent or statute. In any case, British judges and jurists con-
stantly complained that the early law digests were vague, self-contradictory, and silent on the topics
that they heard disputes over.
57 In recent times, scholars have sought to qualify Partha Chatterjee’s formulation by highlight-
ing the continued colonial legal intervention, at the invitation of Indian elites, in the most intimate
spheres of Indian life. Praveena Kodoth, “Courting Legitimacy or Delegitimizing Custom? Sexu-
ality, Sambandham, and Marriage Reform in Late-Nineteenth-Century Malabar,” Modern Asian
Studies 35, 2 (2001): 349–84, at 355–56.
58 Mody, “Love and the Law,” 229.
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law requiring the husband to commit himself to monogamy for life. Certainly,
the Young Turks within the Samaj were eager to use this tool to discipline those
that they saw as hypocritically lax about putting their religious and social prin-
ciples into practice, and the law was to be their acid test of membership in what
they increasingly saw as a distinct group, the community of Brahmos.59 The
declaration required of parties that they did not belong to any major recognized
religions of India, including Hinduism, was rather superﬂuous, once Brahmos
practically made their daughters unmarriageable by refusing to marry them
under fourteen and threatening their potential son-in-laws with criminal
action should they ever take another wife. Unmarriageable daughters of
upper caste fathers effected their excommunication much more effectively
than any declaration of self-excommunication could. This was of course a
necessary sacriﬁce, or not even a sacriﬁce, for those keen on developing a
coherent sense of Brahmo community, among other things because it discour-
aged doctrinally suspect intermarriage between idolatrous Hindus and mono-
theistic Brahmos.
The irony was that Keshub, the leader of the “progressives” at the time of
seeking legislation, was himself put to the test and found wanting when, in
1878, he permitted his thirteen-year-old daughter Suniti to marry the heir to
the Kuchbehar throne, in a wedding replete with traditional Hindu ceremo-
nial.60 This widely publicized and debated marriage led to a further split
among the progressives in the numerically tiny Brahmo Samaj. But why did
Keshub walk into such a trap?
To understand the historical reasons for the creation of India’s second civil
marriage law, the Special Marriage Act of 1872, it is essential to understand
the principal concerns that motivated Keshub Chandra Sen’s original petition
to the government in 1868. All too often scholars have concentrated on features
of the law which in retrospect appeared “reformist” and “progressive,” such as a
minimum age of marriage, the validity of inter-caste marriage, and monogamy,
and have thereby assumed that the law was demanded and secured by the “refor-
mist” section of the Brahmos.61 It was, but Keshub was neither out to enforce
reform on the Samaj nor interested in securing recognition for Brahmos as a dis-
tinct religious community. Quite the reverse; he wanted to secure the validity of
unorthodox Brahmo marriages that arose out of their existing reformist practices,
59 For this reason, Sibnath Sastri, an important “radical” Brahmo, engendered the proposition
that with the passing of the Special Marriage Act, the break between Hindus and Brahmos
became complete. Amiya Sen, Hindu Revivalism in Bengal 1872–1905: Some Essays in Intepreta-
tion (Delhi, 1993), 135. As Sen points out, Sastri’s wishful thinking was transmuted into a fact
through its frequent repetition by future scholars.
60 Meredith Borthwick, Keshub Chandra Sen: A Search for Cultural Synthesis (Calcutta, 1977),
174–201; David Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton,
1979), 138–41.
61 Kopf, Brahmo Samaj, 103–5.
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ensure the legitimacy of children born of such marriages, and most crucially,
protect the inheritance rights of the family so created. His concerns made
perfect sense in the context of the constant conﬂict Brahmos faced with conser-
vative Hindus, who were often members of these same families.
Anybody acquainted with the British legal approach to marriage would be
concerned regarding the validity of Brahmo marriages in the eyes of law. As
described above, since the mid-eighteenth century all marriages in Britain, to
be valid, had to conform to speciﬁc statutory provisions that deﬁned the
range of rites that could be practiced. Jewish and Quaker marriages by their
own ceremonies were valid because of express legal sanction given to them.
For colonies, the validity of non-Christian marriages also had to be explicitly
preserved by exemption.62
That Keshub was well aware of the risks associated with unorthodox mar-
riages is revealed in his ﬁrst missive to the advocate-general of Calcutta, and
the response revealed the particular legal problem the Brahmo Samaj was
faced with:
Q. Whether, in the absence of a special enactment, the general spirit of English law is
favourable to marriages contracted between individuals of a new religious community,
under purely moral and religious necessities and upon principles and after a ritual not
sanctioned by any existing legally recognized communities, or will it hold such mar-
riages to be illegal at once?
A. I hardly know how to answer the ﬁrst question. Putting out of question marriages
solemnized in foreign countries, the only marriages which the general English law for-
merly recognized, other than marriages solemnized according to forms of that law, were
those between Jews and Quakers. The recognition of marriages between Quakers was of
very gradual introduction, and can hardly be said to have been established until such
marriages were referred to in, and exempted from, the English Marriage Act of 1753.
Under the more recent Registration Acts, in England, persons belonging to any particu-
lar religious body may have their marriages solemnized according to the form adopted
by such religious body, but those marriages derive their legal validity exclusively from
the presence of the Registrar. In the absence of special enactment, a marriage between
two members of a new religious community, such as the Brahma-samaja, not celebrated
in accordance with the provision of any of the Marriage Acts in force in India nor with
those required by Hindu law, would, I apprehend, be invalid.
Q. How far are such marriage-contracts binding on the parties who marry? If the wife
be deserted by her husband without any just cause, or denied the necessaries of life, will
the law under the present circumstances give her any protection?
A. It follows that, in the present state of the law, such marriages as last adverted to are
not binding on the parties, and that the (so-called) wife would have no legal redress if
deserted by her husband, nor would the offspring of such unions be legitimate, or
62 The absence of such a law preserving Hindu and Muslim marriages in South Africa, for
example, led to the threat of their invalidation when the Cape Supreme Court ruled in 1913 that
marriages conducted under the rules of a religion that permitted polygamy were invalid. Following
Gandhi’s satyagraha, Hindu, Muslim, and Parsi marriages were given express recognition by the
Indian Relief Act, 1914. R. A. Huttenback, “Indians in South Africa, 1860–1914: The British
Imperial Philosophy on Trial,” English Historical Review 81 (Apr. 1966): 273–91.
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have any rights of succession, though it would of course be perfectly competent for the
parents to provide for such children by will.
Keshub of course, could not anticipate this damning answer, but wanted to
check: “If such marriage-contracts be binding for all legal purposes on the
parties marrying, will their children be entitled to their property after their
demise as their legitimate children, in case they expressly make such provision
in their will? Will such children be entitled to their property in the absence of a
will?” The advocate-general answered:
Any provision made by will by a member of the Brahma-Samaja in favour of his chil-
dren would be paramount to the claims of any Hindu relatives, and this would extend, so
far as Bengal is concerned, to the father’s share in ancestral, as well as to this self-
acquired property. In the provinces other than Bengal, where the testamentary power
is more limited, and also in the absence of a will, the children would not be entitled
to the succession. But even where the Mitakshara law prevails, the father may leave
by will his self-acquired property to his children by a marriage according to the forms
adopted by the Brahma-samaja. It would be a prudent precaution in all cases for the tes-
tator to name the children whom he intends to make his devisees, and not merely refer to
them as his children or sons or daughters.63
In other words, the children could be protected to a certain extent by a father of
independent means, and by a very carefully worded will. The situation did not
appear reassuring at all, and the advocate general himself recommended that
they acquire an “authoritative legal decision” on the issue.
Hence Keshub appealed to the Viceroy’s Council for the validation of mar-
riages by Brahmo rites, a kind of appeal that British legislators were very fam-
iliar with, given numerous nineteenth-century legislations to validate marriages
by different Christian rites. Henry Maine explained to the Viceroy’s Council his
reasons for a more general, but not universal law:
It has been unavoidable to make the measure more general than was at ﬁrst intended. I
certainly hold it to be good policy in India, considering the unknown depths of native
feeling on the subject, to conﬁne relief in matters connected with religion as much as
possible to the class that seeks it and establishes a case for it…. I would have gladly
limited the operation of this Bill to the Brahmo sect. But after much conversation
with Baboo Keshub Chunder Sen, I ﬁnd that the sect has passed through many
phases of religious feeling. The process by which it is recruited, the abandonment by
young educated Natives of Hindooism and of Hindoo rites is unquestionably on the
increase, but reluctance to enroll themselves in any one sect, or to profess any deﬁnite
creed, is increasing also. In the column of the register of the Calcutta University in which
the “religion” of the undergraduates is recoded, may be seen every sort of novel creed
—“Theist,” “Vedaist,” “Pantheist,” and “Spiritualist” are among the commonest, and it
is to be recollected that the young men who so describe themselves have about reached
the age at which Natives marry. If then we conﬁne the measure to “Brahmos,” we might
63 “Papers Relating to the Bill to Legalize Marriages between Certain Natives of India not Pro-
fessing the Christian Religion,” No. 12, India Bills Objects and Reasons, 1872, L/PJ/5/15, Asia
Paciﬁc and Africa Collections, British Library.
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have applications for a fresh measure soon declaring that they could not conscientiously
subscribe to the Brahmo creed.
As Maine had correctly diagnosed, being “Brahmo”was only one in a spectrum
of religious-social experimentation among the volatile and vocal class from
which the appeal arose. He therefore proposed a native marriage act that
would provide for civil marriage (before a registrar) for those who were not
Christians (since civil marriage for Christians had already been provided for,
and had distinct conditions for eligibility), and who did not wish to celebrate
their marriage by Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Parsi, or Jewish rites.64 Once
again, race and religion overlapped unevenly in the creation of an Indian
civil marriage law, mirroring the racial and confessional limitations of the
civil marriage law of 1852 that was meant only for Christians.
Within the problematically deﬁned racial-confessional jurisdiction of the
law, Maine revealed no intention to facilitate the progress of Indian society
from status to contract, expressing much greater concern that religious
dissent (i.e., conscientious objections to using a certain marriage rite) might
become a route for evading parental and social control. Keshub had proposed
that the bride and groom had to be at least fourteen and eighteen years of age,
respectively, but Maine said: “The power of civil marriage might be abused by
inducing the daughters of orthodox Hindoos to marry against their parents’
wishes,” and so he thought it necessary to add the requirement of parental
consent for brides up to the age of eighteen. In the imperial context, all
aspects of liberalism were susceptible to radical inversion. Maine intended to
offer toleration for religious dissent, not license for social revolution. Even
in this limited aim he made, as subsequent events showed, an inadequate
assessment of the legal devices required. Keshub, making a shrewder guess,
wanted a legislative declaration that descendants of persons marrying under
the Act should inherit according to the law of inheritance applicable to the
last ancestor who professed a recognized native religion. That is, if a Hindu
became Brahmo, and married under the proposed law, his children could
claim their entire inheritance, both ancestral and personal, under Hindu law.
Keshub, therefore, had no intention of forcing an exit from the circle of
kinship and property relations for those Brahmos who married under the new
law. That is, he had no particular interest in marking the distinct “identity”
of Brahmos in law. Neither did Maine, but he felt that such a speciﬁc clause
regarding inheritance rights was both rigid and unnecessary. In his view:
All which the Brahmos require is given by the existing law as laid down by the Privy
Council in a most important case Abraham v. Abraham (Moore’s Indian Appeals, p.
195). It was there decided that a Native abandoning Hindooism or Mahometanism as
a religion may at pleasure continue to live under Hindoo or Mahometan civil law, or
may exchange it for any other recognized set of usages. The provision, therefore,
64 Minute by Henry Maine… (see n. 14 above).
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requested by the Brahmos would in reality abridge their liberty. A Brahmo may wish to
adopt Christianity, and with it (as with the case with the parties in Abraham v. Abraham)
English law. There seems no reason for preventing his doing so.65
As it turned out, Maine was wrong; he had failed to appreciate the direction of
the personal laws as a system, which would make such a civil (as non-religious)
arena of marital and property relations elusive, if not impossible.
T H E S E C O N D S TA G E : A B R A HMO MAR R I A G E L AW
The huge volume of protests against this draft law can be traced to two sources:
those who thought that the law, by its permissiveness, included their social or
religious group and by doing so, undermined established social and religious
authority, and the Brahmos themselves. These were dealt with, not by
Maine, but by Fitzjames Stephen, Maine’s nominated successor to the ofﬁce
of the law member of the Viceroy’s Council. Stephen was a Benthamite
devoted to codiﬁcation of law, creating in his Indian career the Indian Evidence
Act, Contract Act, and a revised code of criminal procedure.66 Uniformity
rather than permissiveness was his forte: encountering the protests described
above, Stephen considered a law that was explicitly restricted to Brahmos.
However, this measure led to panicked protests from all those members of
the Brahmo Samaj, who did not wish their professed social progressivism to
be legally prescribed for them.
Permissiveness became a problematic category because it was being pre-
cisely deﬁned against what it was not, among other things that it was not
Hindu. It appeared that if a certain set of marriage practices, and by derivation,
those that followed those practices, were classiﬁed as permissive, hence non-
Hindu, one then was subjected to novel conditions for the privilege of enjoying
the right to such marriages. The problem with such conﬂation was forcefully
represented by the protest of the Coorgs, whose social customs would later
achieve international fame among sociologists.67 In 1869, in response to a cir-
cular to all Provincial governments regarding the viability of the legislation, the
65 This, then, should be a correction to a study of Abraham v. Abraham that has suggested the
case represented British efforts to forcibly reinstate converts to Christianity within the Hindu com-
munity they had exited. As Chandra Mallampalli has rightly pointed out, there is no reason to
assume that such converts wished to deprive themselves of inheritance under Hindu law in the
ﬁrst place. Gauri Vishwanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton,
1998), 75–117; Chandra Mallampalli, Christians and Public Life in Colonial South India 1863–
1937: Contending with Marginality (London, 2004), 21–80, especially with regard to inheritance
laws, 38–58. This is equally true of Brahmos, and that should lead us to query the grouping of a
large range of religious behavior as “conversion,” or a complete self-removal from one system
of belief, practice, and sociality to another.
66 K.J.M. Smith, “Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, First Baronet (1829–1894),”Oxford Dictionary
of National Biography (Oxford, 2004); online ed., May 2006, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/
article/26375, accessed 23 May 2010.
67 M. N. Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India (New Delhi, 2003
[1952]).
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chief commissioner of Coorg reported that leading men among the Coorgs had
no objection to the validation of Brahmo marriages, but did not themselves
wish to come under the provisions of the proposed law. Perhaps with some
nudging from Superintendent of Coorg R. A. Cole, who was a bit of an
amateur anthropologist, they said that they were not Hindus, and did not
follow the ritual of Hindu religion. But they asked that this should not lead
to the new law being imposed on them, since if it were, it would effectively
invalidate marriages which were customary among them, because of the pro-
hibited degrees of kin provided for. Coorg men and women, like many other
South Indians, customarily married their cross-cousins,68 who would be con-
sidered too closely related under the new law.69 Besides, inclusion in the
new law appeared to validate inter-caste marriage, which was completely unac-
ceptable to Coorgs. The judicial commissioner of Coorg also pointed out to the
chief commissioner a potential grievance: the Coorgs by coming under this law
would be forced to be monogamous.70 Why did the Coorgs have to give up so
much to enjoy the right to their customary marriages?
A similar point about over-inclusion was made by the Maharaja of Benares, a
leader of Hindu orthodoxy in north India, but from a very different perspec-
tive.71 He complained that altogether too much importance had been given
to the difﬁculties of Brahmos. In his part of the country, Chamars and outcastes
(and obviously he felt that Brahmos were a similar category) did not marry by
Hindu ritual, but no one had ever questioned the validity of their marriages.
Marriages among Brahmos were a matter of similar indifference to orthodox
Hindus, but it was unacceptable that, to accommodate them, a law implicitly
recognizing inter-caste marriages should be imposed on Hindus in general.
In any case, because of Act XX of 1850, converts out of Hinduism, including
“Brahmists,” retained their share of ancestral property, and could even pass it
on to their widows, in contravention of Hindu laws of inheritance. He did
not wish such permission to be extended to all outcastes.72
Both of these objections had an implicit third point, regarding the issue of
penalties attached to social deviance. The Parsi petition from Bombay made
this clear by urging that a person who married under the law, declaring that
he did not wish to follow Zoroastrian rites of marriages, should be placed
outside the Parsi community for all purposes, that is, for inheritance as
68 For men, these were their father’s sister’s daughters, and mother’s brother’s daughters; for
women, their father’s sister’s sons, and mother’s brother’s sons.
69 The schedule of prohibited relationships, provided by Keshub, represented the cultural speci-
ﬁcity of upper-caste Hindu Bengali marriage practices.
70 Chief Commissioner Coorg to Sect. to the Council of the Governor General of India, 12 May
1869, in “Papers Relating to the Bill to Legalize Marriages….”
71 Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and
Nineteenth-Century Banaras (Delhi, 1997), 64–82.
72 Memorandum of the Deputy Superintendent of the family domains of the Maharaja of
Benares, 24 Dec. 1869, in “Papers Relating to the Bill to Legalize Marriages…,” No. 9.
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well.73 The Parsi approach was not to question the validity of the unorthodox
marriage itself, but to exclude those who undertook it from legal relations
enabling inheritance, which was in line with the particular history by which
an increasingly restricted deﬁnition of “Parsi-ness,” premised on a conﬂation
of race and religion, was developed.74
Faced with these objections, Stephen referred the bill to a select committee
which he chaired, which decided in early 1871 that the law should be restricted
only to those Brahmos who were prepared to declare their distinctiveness with
the prescribed declaration: “I am a member of the Brahma Samaja.”75 Note here
that the legal deﬁnition of Brahmos as a “community” was not a demand made
by any Brahmo, but a legal device proposed by embattled British legislators,
who thought that a “Brahma Marriage Act” would smooth rufﬂed feathers.
They were wrong, because this time there was a rush of petitions from
various shades of Brahmos (and no one could be blamed for being unac-
quainted with all the varieties within this numerically tiny but highly volatile
religious spectrum). From Simla, a petition of Brahmos bearing 2050 signa-
tures expressed alarm at being subjected to a Brahma Marriage Act, for
which they saw no need, and which would severe them from the general
body of Hindus, of which they were an integral part. They resented the assump-
tion that the present form of marriage among Brahmos was not valid and
required legislative correction. In their view, their marriage ceremonies rep-
resented the purest form of Hinduism, and in any case, new sects with novel
rituals had often arisen within Hinduism, and their legality had never been
questioned. As for a minimum age of marriage for girls, and monogamy, all
high-minded Hindus recommended such things, including the Sanatana
Dharma Rakhini Sabha. However, it was argued, there was no need for a
law to suppress practices that had to die down through evolution.76
The Brahmo petition was the exact obverse of that of the Coorgs: both sets of
petitioners resented being subjected to a law of marriage that restricted the
existing rights of male members of the social group, as a price for privileges
they already possessed. Coorg marriages were customary, and the Adi-
Brahmos (Debendranath’s more conservative, “Hindu-Brahmo” group) did
not feel that their marriages were unorthodox. All felt that provisions for
male monogamy and prohibition of underage marriage an imposition: although
73 Memorandum by Honorable Mr. M. J. Shaw Stewart, dated 27 Feb. 1869, forwarding peti-
tions of Mr. Framjee Nesserwanjee Patel and Mr. Venayekrow Juganathjee Sunkersett, in
“Papers Relating to the Bill to Legalize Marriages…,” No. 1.
74 See Mitra June Sharaﬁ, “Bella’s Case: Parsi Identity and the Law in Colonial Rangoon,
Bombay and London, 1887–1925,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Princeton, 2006.
75 “A Bill to Legalize Marriages between Members of the Brahmo Samaja (as Amended by the
Select Committee),” 27 Mar. 1871, in India Bills, Objects and Reasons, 1872, L/PJ/5/15, Asia
Paciﬁc and Africa Collections, British Library.
76 To the Viceroy, from members of the Brahma Samaja, Simla, in “Papers Relating to the Bill to
Legalize Marriages…,” No. 14.
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all Brahmos ofﬁcially recommended such measures, it was quite another thing
to be have them made compulsory by law. One might argue that had this law
been passed Keshub would have had even less moral space to obfuscate
about his daughter’s marriage.
T H E F I N A L S TA G E : A L AW F O R T H O S E WHO B E L O N G ED N OWH E R E 7 7
Fitzjames Stephen now chaired a second Select Committee to reconcile the
objection of Brahmos that they were not unlike Hindus, with objections from
everybody else that they were not like the Brahmos. In any case, almost every-
body was concerned to avert the risk of social permissiveness being unleashed,
for Brahmos this translating as social progressiveness being imposed. Hence
the ﬁnal version of the law, which as Act III of 1872 received the assent of
the governor general on 22 March 1872, applied to parties who would
declare that they did not profess the Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Muhammadan,
Parsi, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jaina religions, and subjected them to the contentious
age, kinship, and monogamy restrictions. Not all were satisﬁed: a conservative
Hindu, Kali Prasanna Banarji, objected that “not Hindu” was an overly
capacious category, and that it might be used by Hindus who were morally
lax, or had violated caste and ritual rules, to avoid costly expiatory rituals.
All they needed to say was that they were “not Hindu,” and of course marry
a person willing to say the same, and they would be beyond the regulatory
power of Hindu society. In his opinion, if “Brahmo” had proved too broad a
category, the law could have been further restricted, for example to “Progress-
ive Brahmos” or “Keshubites.”78 Having seen the effects of the proposed
Brahma Marriage Act, Stephen refused to be drawn in once again into deﬁning
such a volatile and argumentative set of Indians, and he chose instead to leave
the law’s jurisdiction open to choice.
WHO WE R E T H E B R A HMO S ?
The personal laws were (and still are) based on a theory of social organization,
which assumed the objective existence of ﬁnite and mutually exclusive social
groups deﬁned by religion, each potentially possessing a personal law, subject
to it becoming articulately self-aware. Many scholars have observed in the
context of larger and arguably less labile communities that social reality was
distinctly more complex than the law would have it. I would add that people
nevertheless engaged actively with the ﬂattening legal categories, not only to
77 I ﬁnd Mody’s use of the term “not-community” to describe “love-marriage” couples interest-
ing, except that it appears to assume the objective existence of “communities.” I take the view that
“community” is a species of political argument, as well a manipulative category of legal
governance.
78 Opinion of Babu Kali Prasanna Banarji, 1 Feb. 1872, in “Papers Relating to the Bill to Lega-
lize Marriages…,” No. 18. Two days later, Kali Prasanna also warned that such marriages would be
considered invalid by society.
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resist them, but also in many cases to manipulate them for their own purposes.
The conﬂicts described among those that called themselves Brahmos represent
the tip of the iceberg; constant disputes over the membership of personal law
communities is endemic to the system, which offers different legal privileges
dependent on one’s personal law status. The attractions of any particular privi-
lege depend on a person’s or group’s subject position.
Who the Brahmos were, therefore, depended on who was speaking, and for
what purpose. The range of legal conceptions of the category “Brahmo” that
we can perceive during the debates preceding the enactment of Act III of 1872
derived from the larger debates about religious identity in the volatile world of
religious, social, and personal experimentation that was nineteenth-century
upper caste Hindu society, the nascent bhadralok. David Kopf’s seminal work
on the Brahmo Samaj identiﬁed two principal lines of self-identiﬁcation among
the Brahmos: those who tended towards chauvinistic Hindu nationalism and
those inspired by a liberal, reformist humanism. It appears to me that “reformism”
is a category that needs further attention, especially with reference to the rise of
the sectarian reformists, who moved from an interest in transforming wider
society to one in converting individuals. But then, what is it that makes a religious
community just that: is it theological and ceremonial creativity, such as the
Tagores were renowned for, or a social burning of bridges, which, as Christian
missionaries often noted, could equally be a sign of atheism and social rebellion?
Rabindranath Tagore’s novel Gora, which Kopf has also utilized,79 reveals a
much more complex picture of the variety of ways in which a person could be
a Brahmo, for all or part of their life, each position involving a speciﬁc relation-
ship with that overwhelmingly large and amorphous entity that is Hindu society.80
In this novel, a marriage between a “Brahmo”woman and a “Hindu”man is alter-
natively deﬁned as betrayal of Brahmos, betrayal of Hinduism, and betrayal of the
nation (deﬁned by Hinduism), and Tagore’s favored position, as a valid union
afﬁrming the uplifting, vague, spiritual-ethical domain that is Hindu/Indian, but
humane and liberal enough to accommodate some doctrinal and social exper-
imentation. Nowhere is it simply a marriage between two individuals, although
it is their mutual attraction that produces the drama.
The text offers more than this rather pious resolution. It is a vivid picture of a
society that Rabindranath, as son of Debendranath Tagore, was well acquainted
with. The Tagore family itself included several shades of social practice and
religiosity, including that of Debendranath’s eldest son Satyendranath, who fol-
lowed the “reformist” wing of the Brahmo Samaj,81 and non-Brahmo Hindus
79 Kopf, Brahmo Samaj, ch. 10 on Tagore.
80 Rabindranath Tagore, Gora, in Rabindra-rachanabali (Calcutta, 1964), vol. 6, 109–574. I am
grateful to Professor Tanika Sarkar for alerting me to the crucial relevance of this text to a discussion
of civil marriage laws in India.
81 Kopf, Brahmo Samaj, 132.
C I V I L M A R R I A G E L AW S I N B R I T A I N A N D I N D I A 549
who pursued Hindu “idolatry” with gusto. Sen’s legal concerns, then, arose
from this complex social context, where “Hindu” “Brahmo,” and “Adi
Brahmo” were positions along a spectrum of socio-religious debate, and not
necessarily rigidly separable. The law therefore had to deal not only with the
question of what to do with Brahmos, but who the Brahmos were, and the
three distinct stages that the law passed through represented three different
ways of legally accommodating an active religious movement in the context
of a legal conception that took religious identities to be stable and isolable.
C O N C L U S I O N
It is now time to draw some conclusions from the historical narrative outlined
above. What should we make of this process of demanding, making, and using
the law? I have argued against the idea that civil marriage, especially the Indian
civil marriage law, was the product of a European ideology of complete reli-
gious individualism, which in turn was the product of a process called secular-
ization. The secularization of Europe is a doubtful proposition, if by
secularization one means the irrelevance of religious status to the process of
governance. What is outstanding about British marriage laws at the beginning
of the nineteenth century is hardly the irrelevance of religion, but the enforce-
ment of very different civil implications for different religious choices. As the
century wore on, these implications became less divergent: Catholics could be
elected to Parliament and admitted to university, and Nonconformists could
marry in their own chapels, at ﬁrst under the supervision of a state-appointed
registrar and later without it. But the political arguments used to wear down
these “discriminatory” legal provisions, to use a somewhat anachronistic
term, were themselves discriminatory. Nonconformists appealed for the recog-
nition of their religious ceremonies as equivalent to the Church of England’s
rites, and in doing so, asked for their piece of the state, so to say.
The religious politics of British-ruled India were not in essence very differ-
ent. But the interest in individuated religious liberty was much more muted in
the colonial context, where the state was not just willing but eager to demon-
strate its liberalism, or rather liberality, by recognizing that at their core
Indians were bound to be different from the British and from each other, and
thus that what was required were (limited) domains of law sourced from
various religions. The effect of the system of personal laws was to transmute
the language of religious tolerance in colonial India to mean the tolerance of
collective religious differences, hence “rights” being demanded on behalf of
and accorded to entities called religious communities. Even when people dis-
agreed about the boundaries of such communities, or the orthodoxy of any
one of them, hardly anyone disputed that collective identities were relevant
to law, or ought to be.
On the other hand, the personal laws, especially their regulation of conjug-
ality and property, provided potent disciplining tools, both for constructing and
550 N A N D I N I C H AT T E R J E E
policing the boundaries of religious communities. To deviate from orthodoxy
or to be accused of it could mean not just risking the displeasure of kith and
kin, but also potentially losing the right to enter into a valid marriage or entitle-
ments to shares in coparcenary property, just as Keshub feared that Brahmos
might. His solution and that of Maine, which was basically a pre-emptive
one of preventing ostracism and disinheritance for doctrinal and social devi-
ation, proved impossible given that conservative Hindus could defend the
right to discipline members of the community deﬁned by Hindu personal
law, claiming this right as a religious one.
There could have been one other outcome: a Brahmo personal law, some-
what like the Christian personal law, eventually developing its own orthodoxies
and replicating arguments about religious freedom to discipline deviants. But
the Brahmos, unlike Christians, were too vocal, too organized, and too
similar to other upper caste Hindus to submit to a set of laws that would
make their progressive principles inescapable. And here we see the difference
between Nonconformists in Britain and Brahmos in India: while a Nonconfor-
mist man could marry in England or Wales before a registrar or in a chapel
without fundamentally altering the nature of his domestic and social relations,
no man marrying under the proposed “Brahma Marriage Act” could ignore that
he was burdened with legal obligations that most other men were not, such as to
limit conjugality to one woman for the rest of his life. Not that all Brahmo men,
or even all Hindu men were rabid polygamists, but one has to take into account
the psychological repulsion of being permanently deprived of a privilege that
clearly marked the distinction and hierarchy between men and women in
nineteenth-century India. The solution, then, was the Special Marriage Act,
whose jurisdiction was entirely permissive. For the same reasons that
Brahmos were unwilling to submit to the Brahma Marriage Act, few Indians
wished to avail of this apparently emancipatory permission.
Since the days of Michael Madhusudan Dutt, there had of course been
Indian men who expressed dissatisfaction with traditional marriages, and
sought in their wives intelligent and supportive partners, even romantic
love.82 These usually upwardly mobile professional and mercantile advo-
cates of the nuclear family were however less interested in signing a bond
to monogamy83 than in extracting themselves from the web of obligations
to other male agnates and corporate entities that deﬁned the traditional
Indian family and society, although in legally speciﬁc ways for Muslims,
82 For Madhusudan’s desperate resistance to a marriage arranged for him, see Ghulam Murshid,
Ashar cholone bhuli (Calcutta, 1995), 42–44, 53–58.
83 In 1836, when Ardasir Wadia violated Parsi customs of monogamy by abandoning his ﬁrst
wife and marrying another woman whom he presumably found more companionable, the
younger generation of Parsis prevented the Parsi panchayat from taking action against him.
Susan Stiles Maneck, The Death of Ahriman: Culture, Identity and Theological Change among
the Parsis of India (Bombay, 1997), 173–75.
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Hindus, and Parsis.84 There was nothing in the Special Marriage Act that
promised such an escape route, at least not until the amendment of 1923,
when the removal of the “self-excommunication” clause allowed people
using it to continue to be Hindu, Muslim, or whatever the case might be,
with the proviso that the Indian Succession Act of 1865 would apply to
their property. The Indian Succession Act was legislated in 1865 as part of
the unﬁnished Indian Civil Code; quite like the “Indian Marriage Act” of
1852, it limited itself to Christians (and its testamentary sections to Parsis)
by giving exceptions to Hindus, Muslims, and Parsis. Modeled on British
inheritance laws, this law gave primacy to the nuclear family—property
devolved to the widow and children, rather than male agnates—but only post-
humously. The would-be romantic husband found in that provision very little
to entice him.
84 On the efforts of such men to separate their personal earning from partible ancestral estates,
see David Washbrook, “Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,”Modern Asian Studies
15, 3 (1981): 649–721, esp. 674, 700; Mytheli Sreenivas, “Conjugality and Capital: Gender,
Families and Property under Colonial Law in India,” Journal of Asian Studies 63, 4 (2004):
937–60.
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